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in nature.'" While such a decision is ideologically sound, to note its
practical difficulties would seem equally sound; and if the Supreme4
Court takes the same position as to retroactivity in Mallory v. Hogan.
the reaction from the various states will indeed make the welkin ring.

Jeff ery Graham
Constitutional Law-PRIVILEGE FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION-APPLICATION IN STATE COURTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-The

petitioner, ordered to testify before a referee appointed by the Superior
Court of Hartford County, refused to answer questions concerning his
earlier arrest and conviction for pool-selling on the grounds that his
answers might tend to incriminate him. He was adjudged in contempt
by the Superior Court and imprisoned until he was willing to answer the
questions.
The Superior Court denied an application for a writ of habeas corpus;
and that decision was upheld by the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors, which ruled: (1) that the privilege against self-incrimination
as stated in the Fifth Amendment is not available to a witness in a state
proceeding; (2) that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend the
privilege to him; (3) that the privilege under the Connecticut Constitution had not been properly invoked.'
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the petitioner the privilege stated
in the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination and that the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors incorrectly ruled that the privilege
was not properly invoked.'
Justice Field's 1891 dissent in O'Niel v. Vermonta is the first indication by the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment might
be considered to incorporate the Bill of Rights. In 1904 Adams v.
13. Per curiam opinions: 372 U.S. 766-770, 773-780 (1963). See also, U.S. ex rel
Craig v. Meyers, 220 F. Supp. 762 (ED. Pa. 1963), where state courts holding that
Gideon was prospective is overruled.
14. Mallory v. Hogan, 64 S.Ct. 1489 (1964), Court brought the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination within the 14th Amendment's due process clause
and thereby expressly overruled Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
1. Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963).
2. Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S. Cr. 1489 (1964).
3. 144 U.S. at 363 (1891) "These rights, as those of citizens of the United States
find their recognition and guaranty against Federal action in the Constitution of the
United States and against State action in the Fourteenth Amendment." See also,
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, The Judicial
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New York, 4 according to some writers, 5 tentatively held that the Fifth
Amendment comes under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. After avoiding resolution of that issue in a number of
cases6 the Supreme Court squarely faced the question as one of first
impression in Twining v. New Jersey7 and ruled, under assumed facts,"
that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment is not made obligatory on the states by the
Due Process or Privilege and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment but is merely a rule of evidence. Despite some feelings
to the contrary,9 the rule stated in Twining stood, although objected
to by some jurists,' until the present case. The United States Supreme
Court, repudiating the Twining view, ruled that the freedom from
compulsory self-incrimination is fundamental to our accusatorial system
of justice and as such is within the established standard for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court then directed
Interpretation2 STAN. L. REv. 151 (1948).
4. 192 US. 585 (1904).
5. Corwin: The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
MicH. L. REv. 1:1, at 202 (1930).
6. Supra, note 4; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
7. 211 US. 78 (1908).
8. Id. at 114. "We have assumed only for the purpose of discussion that what was
done in the case at the bar, was an infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination. We do not intend, however, to lend any countenance to the truth of that
assumption."
9. Supra, note 5 at 201. "In view of this lahiguage [Professor Corwin is referring
to the words of the Twining opinion] the point should unquestionably be regarded as
still an open one under the United States Constitution.'
10. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 141, 142 (1953), Justice Black wrote in .a
dissenting opinion: "I think the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the States and state courts like federal courts are therefore -barred from
convicting a person for a crime on testimony which either federal or state officers have
compelled him to give against himself. The construction I give to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments makes it possible for me to adhere to what we said in Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155, that 'The Constitution of the United States stands as a
bar against the conviction of any individual in an American court by means of a
coerced confession.'"
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952), Justice Douglas concurring, wrote
of the freedom from compulsory self-incrimination, "If it is a requirement of Due Process
for a trial in a federal courthouse it is impossible for me to say it is not a requirement
of Due Process in the State courthouse.'
11. Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 208 (1961); Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 659 (1947). The standard of application of
Due Process used by the Supreme Court is "a principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'
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the trial judges "not to be skeptical" when determining whether the
witness apprehends sufficient danger in answering as to warrant invoking the privilege; thereby returning to the witness the discretion
2
he once had.1
This case reflects the Court's willingness to review past decisions in
the light of more recent applications of the Fourteenth Amendment to
sections of the Bill of Rights. 13 The seeds of the present decision are
rooted in the earlier rulings of this Court condemning coerced confessions in state criminal prosecutions, 14 confessions forced by falsely
aroused sympathy' 5 and the use of torture to compel testimony. 16
As a result of this case a witness in a state proceeding may act as he
would in a similar federal proceeding with regard to invoking the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. No particular formula of words must be used, all that is required is a statement
of reliance on that section of the Fifth Amendment. 7 In the past all
States have recognized such a privilege,' 8 however, they have not all
had the same standard to invoke its use; the establishment of such a
standard is the fundamental change made by this decision.
The uniformity achieved by this case causes some to foresee the
12. The adopted guideline stated in U.S. v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440-441 (1952) is
as follows: "In determining whether the witness really apprehends danger in answering
a question, the judge cannot permit himself to be skeptical; rather he must be acutely
aware that in the deviousness of crime and its detection, incrimination may be approached and achieved by obscure and unlikely lines of inquiry."
This is the subject of a dissent by Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart. They
believe the rule permitting the judge rather than the witness to determine when an
answer sought is incriminating must not change if the general rule to testify when
subpoenaed is to remain. There is substance to a contrary view, similar to that held
by the Court, Chief Justice Marshall once wrote: "-he Court cannot participate with
him in this judgment, because they cannot decide on the effect of his answer without
knowing what it would be; and a disclosure of that fact to the judges would strip
him of the privileges which the law allows, and which he claims .

.

. it must rest with

himself who alone can tell what it would be, to answer the question or not." 1 Burr's
Trials 244, 245.
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
14. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1935); Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
15. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
16. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
17. Quinn v. U.S., 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
18. The Iowa and New Jersey Constitutions do not contain self-incrimination provisions. In Iowa, the Due Process provision has been held to include the exemption
from compulsory self-incrimination. Koonck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W.2d
269 (1952). A common law privilege had been recognized by New Jersey decisions,
State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 A.2d 743 (1903).
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passing of our federal system, 19 yet for others it represents another
step implementing the true intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °

Alan MacDonald
Torts-DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
BY TRESPASSING CHILD IN ABSENCE OF E NTICEMENr OR ALLUREMENT.-

On April 8, 1964 the Supreme Court of Alaska' reversed a superior court
decision and held that the element of enticement or allurement need not

exist before there can be liability to a child trespasser under the Doctrine
of Attractive Nuisance. 2
Five-year-old Gerald Vaska boarded the defendant's barge by way
of a plank which extended to shore and was killed on deck when a heavy
wooden cargo pallet fell on him. His administrator brought suit to
recover damages for the death of the child. The case was tried by the
Superior Court of the Fourth Judicial District and at the end of the
plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for dismissal. The motion was
granted on the ground that under the evidence and the law, the child's
death was not a result of any negligence on the part of the defendant.
The court further stated that the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine would
not be applicable in this case because there was nothing about the
barge and the cargo pallet that was particularly attractive or inherently
dangerous to young children.
The Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance, as originally formulated, was
in a state of confusion. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a
much criticized opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes,3 held that an occupier
or possessor of land was liable for conditions which were highly
dangerous to a trespassing child, only where there was something about
the land or some object on it that enticed or allured the child into exposing himself to the dangerous condition.4
19. Supra, note 2, a dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark.
20. Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46, 68 (1946).
1. Taylor v. Alaska Rivers Nay. Corp., 391 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1964).
2. The Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance was developed by courts making the oc-

cupier or possessor of land liable for conditions which are highly dangerous to trespassing children. It was considered that because of a child's immaturity and lack of
judgment, he was incapable of understanding and appreciating all of the possible
dangers which he may encounter in trespassing.
3. United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Butt, 258 U.S. 268, 275

(1921).

"A child

was not allowed to recover when he was not induced to trespass by the presence
of a pool of poisoned water that killed him, but discovered it after he had come upon
the land."
4. Keefe v. Milwaukee and St. Paul R.R., 21 Minn., 207, 18 Am. Rep. 393 (1875);

